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Abstract 
Cold War strategy in Western Europe almost exclusively followed the US policy of 
containment. Conventional explanations for this continuity, however, fail to account 
for both the strategic rationale and the scale of domestic support behind attempts to 
‘disengage’ from the Cold War. This article seeks to explain why containment won 
out over disengagement in European strategy. By highlighting the underlying liberal 
tenets of containment, it argues this victory owed more to the advantages afforded the 
political centre by the political institutions of Western Europe than to the logic of 
containment strategy itself. The occupation of the centre-ground by advocates of 
containment afforded them distinct institutional advantages, including an increased 
likelihood of representation in government, greater bargaining strength relative to 
other parties, and limited sources of viable opposition. The dependence of 
containment strategy on centrist strength is demonstrated through a discussion of the 
politics of strategy in the French Fourth Republic. 
 
 
 2 
Introduction 
Security in Western Europe after 1945 is associated with the strategy of 
‘containment’. Evolving beyond its relatively conservative origins in Kennan’s ‘long 
telegram’ of 1947, 1 containment identified the nature of the Soviet system itself as an 
existential threat to the ‘West’, the solution to which lay in the strength and credibility 
of a united, institutionalised, Atlantic alliance, aimed at the eventual defeat of the 
Soviet Union. 2  Explanations for the embrace of containment in Western Europe 
emphasise the importance of international structural drivers pushing governments to 
adopt the strategy, including the proximity of Soviet troops to Western Europe, rising 
enmity between the superpowers, and the reliance of the Europeans on the economic 
and military might of the United States (US).3 But these explanations cannot tell us 
why alternative strategies that also recognised these constraints – the threat from the 
East, relative European weakness, rising superpower tension – failed to feature 
prominently in European security during the period. The principal alternative, termed 
here disengagement, recognised the same premises as containment, but sought to 
overcome them through de-escalation, diplomacy, and a more ‘independent’ 
European posture. And yet, whilst Ostpolitik and Gaullism both offered glimpses of 
what disengagement looked like in practice, it was containment that ‘won out’ in the 
domestic debates over Cold War security in Western Europe. 
 
                                                 
1 George F. Kennan, ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, 25 (1947): 566-583. 
2 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National 
Security Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982): 71-72. 
3 Geir Lundestad, ‘Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952’, Journal 
of Peace Research, 23:3 (1986): 263-277; John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Emerging Post-Revisionist 
Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 7:3 (1983): 171-190, p. 177; Anton W. 
DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1979): 61, 132-136; 
John W. Young, Cold War Europe 1945-1989: A Political History (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 
1991): 29. 
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This article seeks to explain why containment dominated European strategy through a 
detailed examination of the role played by ideology, party politics and domestic 
institutions in determining West European strategy. By turning attention to the 
ideological constituencies underlying both containment and disengagement, and the 
relative power of these distinct groupings, the article locates containment’s success 
not in the internal logics of the strategy itself but rather in the institutional advantages 
conferred on the parties of the political centre in the parliamentary systems of 
Western Europe. Containment strategy, I argue, resonated with – and was in part 
produced by – a distinctly liberal view of international affairs associated with the 
parties (and party factions) at the centre of West European party systems. This vision 
of international relations identified illiberal and anti-democratic governments as the 
primary source of external threats, regarded the institutionalisation of the Western 
world as the primary means of overcoming these threats, and sought to universalise its 
individualist values through the ultimate defeat of the Soviet Union. By contrast, 
disengagement drew support, for different reasons, from socialism and conservatism, 
since both traditions had a tendency to regard the superpowers in equivalent terms, 
believed the primary goal of security strategy to be coexistence, and found the deep 
institutionalisation of ‘the West’ problematic. 
 
The key to understanding the success of containment, I contend, lies in its liberal 
heritage and, in consequence, the location of its supporters at the centre of West 
European party systems. This afforded proponents of the liberal view of security 
distinct institutional advantages over their competitors; namely, increased likelihood 
of government membership, greater influence in governing coalitions, and increased 
strength vis-à-vis the opposition. By privileging the political centre, proportional 
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parliamentary systems afforded increased influence to the liberal strategy of 
containment over the disengagement alternative endorsed by socialists and 
conservatives. Thus, containment did not dominate because it was ‘logical’, but 
because the ideological constituency most supportive of its precepts was empowered 
by parliamentary institutions of West European states. 
 
To illustrate the argument empirically I offer a case study of the politics of French 
strategy in the early Cold War period (1945 to 1966). As I shall demonstrate, French 
adoption of the key elements of containment is made possible only by the emergence 
of a string of centrist coalition governments, whilst the strategy’s decline from the late 
1950s onwards is a direct consequence of the collapse of the political centre at the end 
of the Fourth Republic. Under the tripartiste governments from 1945 to 1947 France 
failed to develop the clear Atlanticist orientation articulated by other West European 
states at the time, owing to the presence of the communists in the government. From 
1947 to 1951, following the expulsion of the communists, a series of ‘third force’ 
coalition governments determined French strategy; composed of centrist parties and 
social democrats, they aligned France firmly with the US in opposition to the Soviets 
and oversaw the institutionalisation of the country’s Atlanticist orientation. The slow 
demise of these governments throughout the 1950s, however, heralded the emergence 
of Gaullism as a political force drawing on support from both left and right, and the 
subsequent adoption of a strategy of disengagement. 
 
The argument elaborated in this article has important implications for our 
understanding of both the politics of Cold War security and the domestic sources of 
international order more generally. With specific reference to the Cold War, by 
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highlighting the non-linear mapping of ideological traditions to divergent strategies of 
overcoming the Soviet threat, the argument highlights the importance of ideology and 
domestic politics in a domain (and period) where these are often thought to have been 
marginal.4 Moreover, the findings also have implications beyond questions of Cold 
War security. The curvilinear relationship between the traditional ‘left-right’ 
ideological spectrum and foreign policy issues, in which both left and right oppose the 
centre, can be witnessed in a host of contemporary issue-areas, including human 
rights and intervention, democratisation, trade policy, global governance, and 
contemporary strategy, including the Western response to the ‘Russian resurgence’.5 
By acknowledging the non-linear politics of international order, we uncover a more 
significant role for political parties and ideology than has hitherto been 
acknowledged.6 
 
 
Strategies of Containment and Disengagement 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, policymakers, scholars and the general 
public in Western Europe were forced to acknowledge the altered contours of the 
international system; the United States and the USSR were now the major global 
powers, the nations of Western Europe were weak in comparison, and the proximity 
                                                 
4 Kevin Hickson, ‘The Postwar Consensus Revisited’, The Political Quarterly, 75:2 (2004): 142-154, 
152; Eugune R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, ‘The Cold War Consensus: Did It Exist?’, Polity, 
22:4 (1990): 627-653, 628; Harriet Jones, ‘The postwar consensus in Britain: thesis, antithesis and 
synthesis’ in Brian Brivati, Julia Buxton and Anthony Seldon (eds.) The Contemporary History 
Handbook (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1996), 41-49; Alan Ware, Political Parties and 
Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): 355. 
5 Jacob Heilbrunn, ‘Bernie Sanders is back – and he wants to reshape US foreign policy’, The 
Spectator, 2017, 21 September, https://blogs.spectator.co.uk/2017/09/bernie-sanders-is-back-and-he-
wants-to-reshape-us-foreign-policy/. 
6 Benjamin Martill, ‘International Ideologies: Paradigms of Ideological Analysis in World Politics’, 
Journal of Political Ideologies, 22:3 (2017): 236-255, 237; Christian Cantir and Juliet Kaarbo, 
‘Contested roles and domestic politics: reflections on role theory in foreign policy analysis and IR 
theory’, Foreign Policy Analysis, 8:1 (2012): 5–24, 14; Jean-Philippe Thérien, ‘The United Nations 
ideology: from ideas to global politics’, Journal of Political Ideologies, 20:3 (2015): 221–243, 225. 
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of the Soviet Union, and the extent of its military capabilities, provided a significant 
threat to European security.7 There emerged, accordingly, a political consensus on the 
salient features of this ‘new’ international order at the domestic level, comprising 
these three insights. Yet within this consensus significant debate and discussion arose 
on the question of how the European states could best obtain security under these 
conditions and what the dictates of the ‘national interest’ demanded in this new 
order.8 Two broad strategies for achieving security in this new superpower-dominated 
international order arose in the late 1940s and 1950s; a strategy of ‘containment’ 
based on the deterrent value of a strong Atlantic alliance, and a strategy of 
‘disengagement’ that sought to reduce tension between the superpowers through 
arbitrage and the adoption of a more neutral European posture (see Figure 1). 
 
Advocates of containment portrayed the Soviet state as an illegitimate and inherently 
threatening authoritarian regime, the expansion of which could only be halted through 
the direct threat of overwhelming force (deterrence), and not by diplomatic 
engagement or Western concessions.9 Containment emphasised the ideological nature 
of the Soviet threat: It was not the power of the USSR alone that created European 
insecurity, but rather the ends to which this power served; namely, the expansion of 
the authoritarian, collectivist, internationalist – and fundamentally anti-individualist – 
ideology of Soviet communism.10 As a corollary, containment sought to embrace and 
formalise the ‘Atlantic’ alignment between the US and its similarly liberal and 
democratic allies in Western Europe as a means of hedging against communist 
                                                 
7 Young, Cold War Europe, 29. 
8 De Porte, Europe Between the Superpowers, 58. 
9 Leonard Woolf, Foreign Policy: The Labour Party’s Dilemma (London: Fabian Society, 1947): 30-
31. 
10 George F. Kennan, ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, 25:1 (1946): 566-582, 566-
567; Jo Grimond, The Liberal Future (London: Faber and Faber, 1959): 151. 
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domination. Advocates of containment placed significant emphasis on 
institutionalisation as the optimal means of providing for collective Western security. 
“Deterrence”, argued Jo Grimond, leader of the British Liberals, “does not mean that 
each nation must keep up its own nuclear arsenal. Deterrence means having enough 
nuclear power to deter and no more…and accepting the need for wider groupings and 
the pooling of national sovereignties”.11 Only by tying states into an interdependent 
framework – through NATO, and, to some extent, European integration – could the 
credibility of the West be demonstrated and its shared capabilities made effective and 
affordable.12 
 
 
Containment was, however, only one strategy available to policymakers in the 
immediate post-war world.  The primary intellectual challenge to containment may be 
termed, most broadly, disengagement, since at its core has been the notion of reducing 
global tension by disengaging from the superpower conflict. Whilst containment has 
entered common usage as an umbrella term for a number of distinct strategies, 
attempts to break out of the strictures of Cold War containment have hitherto been 
described only in terms of their specific manifestations (e.g. Ostpolitik, détente, 
Gaullism) and not as examples of a broader alternative to containment strategy.13 But 
the various attempts to escape from the strictures of Cold War competition are 
sufficiently distinct from containment, and have sufficient commonalities between 
each other, to be usefully considered instances of the same strategy. Efforts at 
disengagement have sought to reduce tensions between the blocs and to de-escalate 
the Cold War from the very beginning. A basic commitment of this approach was the 
                                                 
11 Jo Grimond, The Liberal Challenge (London: Hollis & Carter, 1963): 246. 
12 DePorte, Europe Between the Superpowers, 135-136; Young, Cold War Europe, 8, 30. 
13 E.g. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, Ch. 2. 
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assumption of moral and strategic equivalence between the two superpowers. 
Advocates of disengagement placed the blame for the emerging Cold War on the 
exigencies of the international system (the absence of trust, the prevalence of 
misperception under anarchy) rather than the nature of the Soviet state itself. 
Advocates placed less emphasis on defeating the Soviet Union and did not regard its 
government as inherently illegitimate. Advocates of disengagement also critiqued the 
institutionalisation of the Atlantic region (through NATO and other US-backed 
institutions) on the grounds that this crystallised the formation of opposing blocs and 
stymied the independence and freedom of manoeuvre of the European states. The 
‘manifesto’ of the Bevanites in the British Labour party, for example, recommended 
the ideal of: “Britain holding the balance between the two great power blocs in the 
world, withstanding the policies of each where necessary, mediating between them, or 
at least not tipping the balance too strongly on one side or the other”.14 De Gaulle saw 
the dictates of Cold War strategy similarly, aiming “to disengage France…from the 
integration realised by NATO under American command; to establish relations with 
each of the States of the Eastern bloc, first and foremost Russia, with the object of 
bringing about a détente followed by understanding and co-operation”.15 
 
 
                                                 
14 Aneurin Bevan, Harold Wilson and John Freeman, One Way Only: A Socialist Analysis of the 
Present World Crisis (London: Tribune Publications, 1951): 8-11. 
15 Charles de Gaulle, Memoirs of Hope: Renewal 1958-62, Endeavour 1962- (London: Wiedenfeld and 
Nicholson, 1971): 202. 
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Figure 1: Principles of Containment and Disengagement as Cold War Strategies 
 
 
It is well known, however, that in European Cold War strategy, containment won out 
over its disengagement rival.16 Containment, as practiced, entailed the provision a 
strong, collective Western deterrent to defend against the Soviet threat along with 
efforts to undermine the global prospects of Soviet communism and oversee the 
defeat of the Soviet government. Although successive governments interpreted the 
concept somewhat differently, the basic intellectual framework of containment – the 
anti-communist, Western-centric, institutionalised approach to collective security – 
remained in situ for most of the Cold War. The governments of Western Europe, 
moreover, generally brought into containment strategy and, with few exceptions, 
governmental strategies across the continent were explicitly Atlanticist, anti-Soviet, 
and pro-NATO. Incidences of aberration from the containment norm – such as 
                                                 
16 Young, Cold War Europe, 29; De Porte, Europe Between the Superpowers, 192. 
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détente, Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik or the security strategy of Charles de Gaulle’s 
France in the 1960s – were the exceptions that proved the rule.17 
 
Why containment was so rarely challenged, however, is a question that requires closer 
examination, since it is puzzling in at least three respects. The first is that both 
containment and disengagement received substantial support from a diverse range of 
political constituencies; in the popular and political discourses of security at the time, 
containment was by no means the only game in town. The second reason is that 
containment never had a monopoly on the dictates of political realism: 
Disengagement strategy shared the same sober assessment of the security problematic 
in Europe and offered, one could argue, a more quintessentially realist means of 
dealing with it, since it emphasised prudence and pragmatism, and sought to 
downplay the importance of Soviet ideology. The third reason the dominance of 
containment is puzzling is that the scattered empirical record of strategies aimed at 
de-escalation and coexistence – core principles of disengagement represented 
variously by Ostpolitik and Gaullism – appeared to serve the ‘national interest’ just as 
well, if not better, than containment. We must surmise from the above that, contrary 
to popular perceptions, the dominance of containment was not a foregone conclusion, 
either by virtue of the concept’s ‘realistic’ logic or its status as the only popular 
strategy for dealing with the Soviet threat. The victory of containment, in other words, 
is a puzzle in itself, one worthy of explanation.  
 
 
                                                 
17 Alice Pannier, ‘From one exceptionalism to another: France’s strategic relations with the United 
States and the United Kingdom in the post-Cold War era’, Journal of Strategic Studies, 40:4 (2017): 
475-504,  480; Philip H. Gordon, ‘The normalisation of German foreign policy’, Orbis, 38:2 (1994): 
225-243, 228. 
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Explaining the Victory of Containment 
Existing explanations for the continuity of containment are of two kinds. Explanations 
prevalent in IR theory more generally tend to emphasise the internal logic of the 
strategy itself, or the validity of the suppositions upon which it was based. Realists 
have argued that the scale of the threat posed by the USSR created strong pressures 
for European states to adopt containment strategy to defend against the Soviet 
threat.18 As noted by Waltz: “For almost half a century, the constancy of the Soviet 
threat produced a constancy of American policy. Other countries could rely on the 
United States for protection because protecting them seemed to serve American 
security interests.”19 Liberal accounts have focused more on the institutionalisation of 
the Western world during the Cold War, rather than balance of power considerations, 
but in this they too have portrayed key elements of containment, particularly alliance 
credibility and deterrence, as functional – and therefore as largely self-explanatory – 
moves on behalf of the US and its allies. 20 Constructivist scholars, meanwhile, have 
proffered explanations that, whilst affording a greater (initial) role for agency, have 
also relied heavily on system-wide explanations for the emergence of enmity and the 
                                                 
18 Anne Deighton, ‘The Cold War in Europe, 1945-1947: Three Approaches’, in Ngaire Woods (ed), 
Explaining International Relations Since 1945 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996): 89-90; De 
Porte, Europe between the Superpowers, 133-134; John Lewis Gaddis, ‘The Long Peace: Elements of 
Stability in the Postwar International System’, International Security, 10:4 (1986): 99-142, 107; John 
Mearsheimer, ‘Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War’, International Security, 
15:1 (1990): 5-56, 26; Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1979); 
Kenneth N. Waltz, ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 
18:4 (1988): 628. 
19 Kenneth Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, 25:1 (2000): 5-41, 
28. 
20 G. John Ikenberry, ‘Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the Dilemmas of Liberal World 
Order’, Perspectives on Politics, 7:1 (2009): 71-87, 76-78; Bruce Russett, Grasping the Democratic 
Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press): 126; John S. 
Duffield, ‘International regimes and alliance behavior: explaining NATO conventional force levels’, 
International Organization, 46:4 (1992): 819-855; Daniel Deudney & G. John Ikenberry, ‘The nature 
and sources of liberal international order’, Review of International Studies, 25:2 (1999): 179-196; 
Robert Axelrod and Robert O. Keohane, ‘Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and 
Institutions’, World Politics, 38:1 (1985): 226-254; Arthur Stein, ‘Coordination and collaboration: 
regimes in an anarchic world’, International Organization, 36:2 (1982): 299-324. 
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adoption of hard-line responses. 21  Other explanations – favoured by historical 
accounts as well as studies of the individual countries concerned – have emphasised 
the emergence of consensus at the domestic level as the principal reason for strategic 
continuity. The ‘post-war consensus’ between major political parties in West 
European democracies over questions of Cold War strategy, on this view, explains the 
success of containment, since the strategy possessed significant political support 
throughout the period. Oftentimes these explanations are linked to the logics of the 
theoretical accounts, resulting in a familiar combined account which argues that it was 
the requirement of defending Europe from the Soviet Union that led to the emergence 
of a wholesale consensus at the domestic level on the virtues of containment strategy. 
It is thus assumption that underlies much of the literature on the politics of both 
French22 and British23 Cold War strategy, for instance. 
 
Yet these existing accounts – and the received wisdom – are not able to fully account 
for the dominance of containment strategy throughout the Cold War in Western 
Europe. In particular, they struggle to account for the existence of considerable 
opposition to containment by supporters of alternative strategies, grouped here under 
the term disengagement, which sought to manage the Cold War through diplomatic 
                                                 
21 Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, ‘Macrosecuritization and security constellations: reconsidering scale in 
securitization theory’, Review of International Studies, 35:2 (2009): 253-276; Alexander Wendt, 
‘Anarchy is what states make of it: the social construction of power politics’, International 
Organization, 46:2 (1992): 391-425, 404. 
22 Robert Grant, ‘French Defence Policy and European Security’, Political Science Quarterly, 100:3 
(1985): 411-426; P. Hassner and J. Roper, ‘Relations with the Superpowers’, in F. de la Serre, J. 
Lereuz and H. Wallace (eds), French and British Foreign Policies in Transition (Oxford: Berg, 1990) 
23 P. Addison, ‘British Historians and the Debate over the “Postwar Consensus”’, in W.M. Louis (ed), 
More Adventures with Britannia: Personalities, Politics and Culture in Britain (London: I.B. Tauris, 
1998); Alan Dobson, ‘Labour or Conservative: Does It Matter in Anglo-American Relations?’, Journal 
of Contemporary History, 25:4 (1990): 387-407, 393; John S. Duffield, ‘Transatlantic Relations after 
the Cold War: Theory, Evidence, and the Future’, International Studies Perspectives, 2:1 (2001): 93-
115, 93; John Dumbrell, A Special Relationship: Anglo-American Relations from the Cold War to Iraq 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006): 14; Joseph Frankel, ‘Britain’s Changing Role’, International 
Affairs, 50:4 (1974): 574-583; David Reynolds, ‘A ‘special relationship’? America, Britain and the 
international order since the Second World War’, International Affairs, 62:1 (1985): 1-20, 3. 
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engagement with the Soviet Union and by engaging in efforts aimed at bringing about 
a reduction in tension between the superpowers. According to the logic of existing 
approaches, disengagement must either be illogical, unpopular, or both. Illogical, 
from the perspective of IR theory, because systemic pressures did not lead ostensibly 
rational states to adopt this strategy. Unpopular, from the perspective of the ‘post-war 
consensus’, because the strategy failed to gain significant purchase within 
government. And yet the idea that disengagement as an alternative to containment 
was either of these does not stand up to closer theoretical or empirical scrutiny. 
 
Consider, first, the question of whether alternatives to containment were illogical, and 
that they failed to fit with the ‘reality’ of the post-Cold War international system. The 
problem here is that advocates of disengagement started from the same basic 
diagnosis of the nature of the post-1945 international order as did proponents of 
containment, accepting as fact the weakness of the European states, the rise of the 
superpowers, as well as the severity of the threat from the Soviet Union. Proponents 
of disengagement did not seek to ally with the Soviet Union. Rather, they advocated 
efforts to ameliorate inter-bloc tension. In doing so they hoped to maintain (or 
improve) their country’s national security. Ironically, with its emphasis on the balance 
of power, sovereign independence, and the avoidance of a ‘security dilemma’, 
disengagement strategy tapped into core ideals of traditional ‘realist’ thinking on 
international affairs. Moreover, when practiced – as suggested by the examples of 
Gaullism, Ostpolitik and détente – disengagement strategies were relatively successful 
in their aims of maintaining security, reducing global tension, and improving the 
leverage of the country in question. The singular ‘logic’ of containment appears to 
have become established, within IR at least, more as a result of its prevalence in 
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European Cold War strategy than any purported monopoly on the national interest. 
This is perhaps a consequence of the (problematic) unfalsifiability of core realist 
concepts – which map onto almost any behaviour or outcome conceivable24 – which 
has resulted in a situation in which the continuity of containment in itself becomes a 
justification for its internal logic. In contrast to the perceived wisdom, containment 
was not the only logical response to the post-1945 security problematic in Europe, nor 
was it the only one advocated. 
 
This brings us on to the question of the prevalence of disengagement strategy, which 
the idea of a post-war consensus in Cold War strategy would seem to deny. In contrast 
to the widespread notion of consensus, however, support for disengagement came 
from significant constituencies in West European political systems and among the 
publics of these countries. Moreover, at times these constituencies were themselves 
sufficiently vocal that questions of Cold War strategy rose to unprecedented national 
prominence or incited in direct action on behalf of the population. In spite of the 
popular – and unfailingly partisan – characterisation of containment’s opponents as 
far left ‘peaceniks’, support for disengagement – a more independent stance in the 
Cold War and reduced dependence on the West – came frequently from traditional 
conservatives on the right of the political spectrum. 25 And, furthermore, the pattern of 
opposition to containment was not only predictable across the political spectrum, but 
also reasonably constant across different European countries. Given the prevalence of 
                                                 
24 John Vasquez, ‘The Realist Paradigm and Degenerative versus Progressive Research Programs: An 
Appraisal of Neotraditional Research on Waltz’s Balancing Position’, American Political Science 
Review, 91:4 (1997): 899-912; Jeffrey W. Legro & Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is Anybody Still a Realist?’, 
International Security 24:2 (1999): 5-55, 6. 
25 For country-specific examples see in particular: Michael Creswell and Marc Trachtenberg, ‘France 
and the German Question, 1945-1955’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 5:3 (2003): 5-28, 11; Sue 
Onslow, ‘Unreconstructed Nationalists and a Minor Gunboat Operation: Julian Amery, Neil McLean 
and the Suez Crisis’, Contemporary British History, 20:1 (2006): 73-99, 74; Daniel Heidt, ‘“I think that 
would be the end of Canada”: Howard Green, the Nuclear Test Ban, and Interest-Based Foreign Policy, 
1946–1963’, American Review of Canadian Studies, 42:3 (2012): 343-369, 343. 
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support for disengagement from across the political spectrum, it is evident that 
accounts of the post-war consensus are not so much able to explain popular agreement 
on the merits of containment, or indeed consensus between parties per se, but rather 
agreement within government and between the governing parties or factions. What is 
often termed a partisan consensus, then, was more akin to a governmental consensus. 
This, of course, begs the question of why parties and factions supportive of 
disengagement are not represented in the government as frequently of those that 
support containment. 
 
Put simply, existing explanations of West European Cold War strategy fail to 
adequately account for the reasons behind the dominance of one particular reading of 
the dictates of the national interest (containment) over an equally logical and popular 
alternative (disengagement). While containment ultimately came to characterise the 
dominant mode of the European response to the Cold War problematic, it is hard to 
argue this was for reasons of either its functional necessity or its widespread support 
across domestic party systems. Existing theoretical accounts based on a combination 
of IR theory and the ‘post-war consensus’ fail to adequately explain the reasons why 
containment ‘won out’ in debates over European Cold War strategy. Indeed, they 
leave us with a puzzle: How did containment come to dominate alternative strategies 
that had an equally logical basis and significant support among important political 
constituencies? In this article I present an alternative, institutional explanation for the 
dominance of containment strategy, one that takes seriously the existence of 
competing strategies for maintaining the national interest in the post-1945 
international order. I argue that containment was, first and foremost, a liberal 
doctrine, and that the victory of containment over disengagement owed much to the 
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institutional advantages conferred on liberals by virtue of their location at the political 
centre of West European party systems. In other words, the victory of containment is 
best understood as the product of distinct constellations of domestic support, not as an 
objective manifestation of the ‘national interest’ in the European context. 
 
The theoretical part of the argument proceeds in two stages. First, I argue that 
containment and disengagement represent competing logics of security drawn from 
alternative modes of political subjectivity. Containment, I argue, depends at base upon 
key liberal commitments, whilst disengagement relies upon underlying values 
common to both socialism and conservatism. I argue as a result that the pattern of 
political contestation over Cold War strategy has always been curvilinear, rather than 
unidimensional. Second, I argue that the (liberal) strategic preferences of the political 
centre dominated European party systems because of the inherent advantages 
conferred on centrist parties by the parliamentary institutions in these countries. In 
particular, I argue that centrist power was bolstered by a greater chance of receiving 
representation in government, increased influence vis-à-vis non-centrist parties 
relative to the size of the centre-ground, and the fragmentation of the political 
opposition whilst in government. 
 
 
Ideology and the Politics of Cold War Security 
The choice between containment and disengagement was not only a choice between 
two competing ‘options’. The choice of strategies was closely linked to the different 
conceptions of the nature of the international realm held by policymakers and 
politicians and of the divergent political traditions in vogue at the time: socialism, 
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liberalism, and conservatism. These ideological traditions offered a repository of basic 
ontological and normative claims concerning the nature of the individual, the basis of 
political authority, and the nature of the international domain.26 Moreover, they had 
specific implications for how proponents were likely to view the dictates of the 
national interest in the Cold War context. Advocates of containment were primarily 
those who identified ideologically with the tenets of liberalism and supporters of 
disengagement were to be found within both the socialist and conservative ideological 
camps. As such, the politics of European security in the Cold War followed a 
discernible but non-linear pattern distinguished by the distinction between the centre 
of the political spectrum (liberals) and both of the wings (socialists and 
conservatives). 
 
The fundamental elements of containment strategy all share a common basis in the 
philosophical foundations of liberal strategy.27 Several specific elements of liberal 
international thought resonated with, and indeed informed, containment strategy. The 
first was the emphasis on the nature of the Soviet Union’s domestic regime – anti-
democratic, illiberal and protectionist – as the source of insecurity. This aspect of 
containment, responsible for the sharp distinction drawn by the Europeans between 
the threat from the US, and that from the USSR, reflected a core liberal tradition of 
                                                 
26 Martill, ‘International Ideologies’, 236; Martin Ceadel, Thinking about Peace and War (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1987): 1; Michael Doyle, Ways of War and Peace: Realism, Liberalism, and 
Socialism (New York: W.W. Norton, 1997): 18-20. 
27 For a discussion of the ideological underpinnings of liberal international thought see, in particular: 
Azar Gat, Fascist and Liberal Visions of War: Fuller, Liddell Hart, Douhet, and Other Modernists 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Beate Jahn, Liberal Internationalism: Theory, History, Practice 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013): 20; Beate Jahn, ‘Liberal internationalism: from ideology to 
empirical theory – and back again’, International Theory, 1:3 (2009): 409-438; Michael Pugh, Liberal 
Internationalism: The Interwar Movement for Peace in Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
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linking external behaviour to internal characteristics.28 A second link between liberal 
thought and containment could be found in the moral universalism underpinned the 
desire to eradicate communist ideology, defeat the Soviet state, and free the citizens 
of the USSR’s satellite states the world over. Third, and finally, the emphasis on a 
strong and interdependent ‘Western’ deterrent – to be achieved through the 
agglomeration of capabilities under a centralised military command, was a product of 
liberal beliefs in supranational governance and in the functional allocation of 
authority to the international level. 
 
Disengagement, in contrast, resonated with some core assumptions about the nature of 
the international system shared by both socialists and conservatives. First, there was 
the claim that there was little to differentiate the external behaviour of both 
superpowers. Socialists believed both US and Soviet actions risked misperception and 
spiralling aggression29 and pushed for a neutral strategy of mediation to break the 
cycle of spiralling aggression. 30  Conservatives regarded the superpowers as 
equivalents because they portrayed the conflict largely in realist terms, associating 
threat with power, and advocating a balancing strategy to offset dependence on either 
bloc. Thus, for different reasons, socialists and conservatives rejected the core liberal 
tendency to derive sources of external behaviour from specific regime 
characteristics. 31  The second shared characteristic was that the primary goal of 
                                                 
28 Michael W. Doyle, ‘Liberalism and World Politics’, American Political Science Review, 80:4 
(1986): 1151-1169; Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, ‘Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic 
Peace, 1946-1986’, American Political Science Review, 87:3 (1993); 624-638. 
29 Brian Rathbun, Partisan Interventions: European Party Politics and Peace Enforcement in the 
Balkans (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): 20. 
30 Rhiannon Vickers, The Labour Party and the World, Volume 1: The Evolution of Labour’s Foreign 
Policy 1900-51 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003): 169. 
31 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of  International Politics’, 
International Organization, 51:4 (1997): 513-553, 518; Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew, ‘Liberal 
International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands’ in Charles W. Kegley Jr. (ed.) 
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security strategy should be coexistence. Many socialists ascribed the menacing 
behaviour of the Soviet Union to insecurity engendered by American aggression. 
However much they disliked the Soviet system, they believed a reduction in global 
tension would be accompanied by liberalising tendencies in the USSR.32 The aim, 
therefore, was not to wipe the Soviets off the face of the earth. Conservatives, for their 
part, embraced pluralism as the natural corollary of sovereign independence at home; 
for many conservatives there was no duty – but also no right – to intervene in the 
domestic affairs of other nations.33 The Russian political system, however distasteful, 
was the choice of the Russians, and – so long as domestic security could be 
guaranteed - saving the Russian people from communism was not an integral 
component of the national interest.34 A third claim from proponents of disengagement 
was that the institutionalisation of ‘the West’ was itself problematic. Socialists argued 
the move towards supranational governance undermined the capacity of the state to 
intervene domestically and thereby threatened the redistributive agenda of the left.35 
Moreover, they believed the deepening of intra-Western ties contributed to the 
crystallisation of the bloc system that was responsible for so much of the conflict in 
the post-1945 order. 36   Conservatives, on the other hand, regarded transnational 
authority as an illegitimate encroachment on the independence of the nation state – 
                                                                                                                                            
Controversies in International Relations Theory: Realism and the Neoliberal Challenge (New York: St 
Martin’s Press, 1995) 
32 Andrew J. Williams, Labour and Russia: The attitude of the Labour party to the USSR, 1924-34 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1989): 35. 
33 Rathbun, Partisan Interventions, 57; Klaus Dodds and Stuart Elden, ‘Thinking Ahead: David 
Cameron, the Henry Jackson Society and British Neo-conservatism’, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, 10:3 (2008): 347-363, 348-349. 
34 Most accounts of conservatives support for détente note the irony of this position given the often 
fierce anti-communist stance of the individuals concerned, but to find this ironic misunderstands how 
conservatives view the international system. See for example: Heidt, ‘“I think that would be the end of 
Canada, p. 343; Asa McKercher, ‘‘The most serious problem?’ Canada-US relations and Cuba, 1962’, 
Cold War History, 12:1 (2012): 69-88, 70. 
35 Mark Aspinwall, ‘Preferring Europe: Ideology and National Preferences on European Integration’, 
European Union Politics, 3:1 (2002): 81-111, 87. 
36 M.R. Gordon, Conflict and Consensus in Labour’s Foreign Policy 1914-1965 (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1969): 34. 
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and its core prerogatives – many were also sceptical of the ability of supranational 
forms of governance to overcome the role of power in the international system.37 
 
Containment, then, was not just a strategic choice, but a political one too, given that 
that support for the strategy rested on the extent to which individuals endorsed the 
underlying principles of liberal thought. The explanation for the wholesale adoption 
of containment in Western Europe, therefore, lies not in the strategy’s internal ‘logic’ 
(since this is to adopt, a priori, the liberal/centrist argument), nor in the background 
conditions of superpower competition and relative European weakness (since 
advocates of disengagement shared this diagnosis of the post-war order), but rather in 
the influence at the domestic level of key proponents of the liberal view of security. In 
this sense the argument offered here is not dissimilar from accounts of the politics 
European integration, which emphasise the crucial role played by specific domestic 
actors and the specific ideas they held. Craig Parsons, for instance, has contended 
that: “Only due to certain ideas did leaders interpret the choices leading to the EU as 
the best way to realize their countries’ economic welfare and political strength”.38 The 
principal theoretical difference lies not only in the claim that such ideational dynamics 
can be witnessed in questions of Cold War strategy, but that there exists a common 
structuring of these ideas – albeit in a curvilinear fashion – across the left-right 
spectrum.39 
 
                                                 
37 Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Conservative Idealism and International Institutions’, Chicago Journal of 
International Law, 1 (2000): 291-314, 294; Brian C. Rathbun, ‘Does One Right Make a Realist? 
Conservatism, Neoconservatism, and Isolationism in the Foreign Policy Ideology of American Elites’, 
Political Science Quarterly, 123:2 (2008): 271-299, 273. 
38 Craig Parsons, ‘Domestic Interests, Ideas and Integration: The French Case’, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 38:1 (2000): 45-70, 51. 
39 For an account of a similar pattern in relation to European integration, see: Lizbeth Hooghe, Gary 
Marks and Carole J. Wilson, ‘Does Left/Right Structure Party Positions on European Integration?’, 
Comparative Political Studies, 35:8 (2002): 965-989. 
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If the decisive factor in explaining the victory of containment strategy in European 
Cold War strategy is the power of its liberal supporters, then it is necessary to explain 
also where the strength of the liberal centre comes from. This article contends that, 
owing to their pivotal location at the centre of West European party systems, liberals 
are conferred advantages at three key points in the governing process: (1) in the 
process of government formation, (2) in inter-governmental bargaining, and (3) in 
executive-legislative relations. Centrist parties, and their specific views on strategic 
questions, are not only more likely to feature in coalition governments, but also more 
influential within government, and better able to withstand legislative constraints. I 
discuss each of these in turn below. 
 
First, centrist parties are more likely to be included in governing coalitions in 
situations where a single party fails to obtain a majority of seats in the legislature, as 
is a common occurrence in the proportional parliamentary systems in Europe. The 
most common method for identifying potential coalition partners, the ‘minimal-
connected-winning’ approach, 40  suggests that optimal coalitions derive from the 
smallest number of ideologically ‘connected’ parties needed to reach the majority 
threshold. Since the parties of the centre are connected in this manner to the parties of 
the left and the right, they will feature in almost all potential ‘minimal connected 
winning’ coalitions, and are therefore highly likely to feature in the government that is 
subsequently formed. The figures below demonstrate this empirically by showing the 
frequency of government participation (Figure 2) relative to the size of the party types 
in the legislature (Figure 3). Despite their relatively small size, over fifty-percent of 
governments from 1950 to 2006 featured one or more centrist parties. 
                                                 
40 Robert Axelrod, Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Application to Politics 
(Chicago: Markham, 1970). 
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Figure 2: The ratio of average seat-share to frequency of government participation by party type, 1950-2006.41 
 
 
Figure 3: Average percentage of legislative seats by party type, 1945-1990.42 Note that the data are arranged 
differently to the data used for the previous figure, which does not distinguish between centre-right and populist 
conservatism. 
                                                 
41 Data are from Duane Swank, ‘Electoral, Legislative, and Government Strength of Political Parties by 
Ideological Group in Capitalist Democracies, 1950-2006: A Database’, Department of Political 
Science, Marquette University, available at 
http://www.marquette.edu/dept/polisci/documents/part19502006codeupd.pdf. 
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Second, once in coalition with other governing parties, the centre is able to exert a 
disproportionate influence on the direction of the government’s agenda, owing to its 
pivotal potential. 43  Because centre parties feature in multiple potential coalition 
scenarios they often hold the balance of power between larger parties and can 
therefore act as ‘kingmaker’, selecting the party they would prefer to govern with.44 In 
consequence, the survival of the government often depends upon the continuing 
consent of the smaller centre party. When this situation obtains, the collapse of the 
government will negatively affect only the larger party, since the centre party will 
likely continue to govern in coalition with the major opposition party. The credibility 
of the centrist parties to defect from the governing coalition affords them increased 
bargaining power within the government relative to their size and enables them to 
achieve outcomes closer to their preferred position as a condition of their continuing 
support for the present government.45 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
42 Data are from Ian Budge, Hans-Dieter Klingemann, Andrea Volkens, Judith Bara and Eric 
Tanenbaum (eds), Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 
1945-1998 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
43 Ware, Political Parties, 351. 
44 Juliet Kaarbo, ‘Power and Influence in Foreign Policy Decision Making: The Role of Junior 
Coalition Partners in German and Israeli Foreign Policy’, International Studies Quarterly, 40:4 (1996): 
501-530, 505; Christoffer Green-Pedersen, ‘Center Parties, Party Competition, and the Implosion of 
Party Systems: A Study of Centripetal Tendencies in Multiparty Systems’, Political Studies, 52:2 
(2004): 324-341, 327. 
45 Joe Clare, ‘Ideological Fractionalization and the International Conflict Behaviour of Parliamentary 
Democracies’, International Studies Quarterly, 54:4 (2010): 965-987, 981. 
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Switching Centrist Allegiance Stable Centrist Allegiance 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
United Kingdom 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Netherlands 
Norway 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
 
Figure 4: European regimes divided according to whether centrist parties 
have governed with combinations of leftist and rightist partners (first column) 
or only with a single partner of the left or right (second column).46 
 
 
Third, governments forged from one or more centrist elements of a given party system 
are in a stronger position vis-à-vis the legislative owing to the splintered nature of the 
non-governing opposition. Centrist governments makes coordinated opposition 
difficult, since opposing coalitions cannot be ideologically connected, making the 
barriers to collective (and therefore effective) opposition far higher than in cases 
where the opposition is wholly to the right or left of the incumbent government. In 
consequence, the non-centre parties of the left and right display “low or negligible 
levels of coalition potential”.47 Whilst the left and right may hold similar positions on 
issues of international security, the extent of their domestic disagreements means that 
left/right cooperation is rarely durable over the long-term. As a result, whilst the left 
                                                 
46 Data are from J. Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge (eds), Party Government in 48 
Democracies: Composition, Duration, Personnel (Boston: Klewer, 2000). 
47 Giuseppe Ieraci, ‘Centre Parties and Anti-System Oppositions in Polarised Systems’, West European 
Politics, 15:2 (1992): 17-34, 20. 
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and right can block specific pieces of legislation, they struggle to demonstrate 
sufficient consensus for an alternative governmental programme to emerge from 
opposition (see Figure 5). 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Frequency of governing coalitions by party types represented, 1950-2006.48 
 
 
Early Cold War France as a Case Study 
To examine the proposition that it is the relative strength of the political centre – and 
not the intensity of the Soviet threat – that has primarily determined changes in Cold 
War strategy, I examine the politics of strategy in the French during the early Cold 
War from 1945-1966, including the duration of the Fourth Republic (1946-1958) as 
well as the first years of the Fifth Republic (1958-1966). Of all the West European 
countries, France exhibits perhaps the greatest variation in strategy during the Cold 
War, with important implications for its relations with the US and the USSR. 
                                                 
48 Data are from Swank, ‘Strength of Political Parties’. 
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Moreover, this variation goes against the grain of standard assumptions; as the Cold 
War intensifies in the 1960s France begins to jettison the principal components of 
containment (see Figure 6). The collapse of the political centre in France and the rise 
of Gaullism as a political force – drawing on support from left and right alike – 
demonstrates the extent to which the archetypal containment strategy depended for its 
success on the power of centrist elements within the government. The French case 
thus offers an illustrative example of both the non-linear relationship between 
political ideology and Cold War strategy and the advantages afforded the liberal 
parties of the political centre by the institutions of parliamentary governance. 
 
Before we continue, it is worth considering the extent to which the French case is 
representative of the politics of West European strategy; after all, the perception of 
Gaullism as a peculiarly French phenomenon leaves the case open to potential charges 
of selection bias. The assumption of French specificity in this regard, however, is 
based on a conflation of the idiosyncrasy of Gaullist ideology with that of Gaullist 
success. What is unique about the French case is not Gaullism per se, since traditional 
conservatism has been associated with disengagement strategy across a number of 
other states during the period. Rather, what is unique about the French case is the 
ascendency of traditional conservatism to a position of domestic influence that is 
simply not afforded its proponents in other systems. In consequence, the French case 
is the exception that proves the rule – in methodological terms, the ‘crucial case’ – 
insofar as it demonstrates the consequences of centrist collapse for Cold War strategy. 
Moreover, since the decline in the influence of the French centre is the product of 
factors largely exogenous to debates over Cold War strategy – specifically, France’s 
efforts to hold on to its colonies – the case of the Fourth Republic is able to 
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demonstrate that strategic changes are the product of shifting coalitions at the 
domestic level rather than any perceived failure in containment itself. The French case 
is thus representative of the broader phenomenon of the non-linear politics of 
containment, but unique in demonstrating the strategic consequences of the collapse 
of the political centre. That the centre ‘holds’ across the rest of the Western world 
should not be considered evidence against the domestic sources of strategy, but rather 
evidence in support of it, since – as I demonstrate below – the dominance of 
containment is principally the product of the corresponding domestic dominance of 
the political centre. 
 
In the remainder of this article, I focus on the case of the French Fourth Republic, 
since it offers perhaps the starkest example of the non-linear politics of Cold War 
strategy and, more importantly, since the largely exogenous collapse of the political 
centre from the late 1950s onwards demonstrates well the strategic consequences of 
the decline of the liberal worldview in government. 
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Figure 6: The intensity of the Cold War, 1948-1978. Data are derived from the average enmity between the US 
and USSR, measured using the intensity scores from the COPDAB events dataset.49 
 
 
Ideology and Party Positions in the Cold War France 
An initial examination of the positions on Cold War strategy of the major political 
groupings under the Fourth Republic – many of which would continue into the early 
years of the Fifth Republic – confirms the extent to which the relationship between 
ideology and Cold War strategy was non-linear. The socialist parties of the left (the 
communists and the left-wing faction of the socialists) and the conservative parties of 
the right (the Gaullists) both advocated strategies of disengagement; that is, they 
viewed the superpowers in equivalent terms, argued in favour of greater neutrality, 
sought to bring about the conditions for coexistence, and challenged the 
institutionalisation of the ‘Western’ world. 
 
                                                 
49 Data are from Edward Azar, ‘Conflict and Peace Data (COPDAB), 1948-1978’, University of 
Maryland Center for International Development and Conflict Management, (1993). 
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The principal exponent of Marxist ideology in France was the Parti communist 
francais (PCF - French Communist Party). PCF policies stressed the importance of 
central planning and the suppression of market mechanisms, viewing national control 
of industry and the creation of self-managing workers’ councils (autogestion) as the 
most appropriate means of regulating economic activity.50 The PCF’s distrust of the 
capitalist interests of the Western states manifested itself in opposition to both NATO 
and the process of European unification, both of which it viewed, with suspicion, as 
serving the expansionist interests of capital through bellicose means. From the PCF’s 
perspective: “The United States was a capitalist behemoth threatening French 
political, social, economic, and cultural independence”.51 The dominant socialist party 
in the Fourth Republic, on the other hand, and the partner in many governing 
coalitions, was the Section Française de l'Internationale Ouvrière (SFIO - French 
Section of the Workers’ International). The SFIO was divided between a minority 
leftist faction that espoused a more-Marxist domestic line – and advocated greater 
levels of state intervention – and a majority faction which was more social democratic 
and, broadly, social liberal in its orientation.52 Unsurprisingly this intra-party divide 
resulted in differing positions on Cold War strategy, with the left wing of the party 
supporting disengagement (neutrality, coexistence, national independence) while the 
right wing broadly supported the contours of containment, albeit accompanied by 
leftist humanitarian rhetoric aimed at the creation of “a peaceful world devoid of 
political, economic, or social barriers”.53 
                                                 
50 David Scott Bell and Byron Criddle, The French Communist Party in the Fifth Republic (Oxford: 
Clarendon, 1994): 37-38. 
51 Richard F. Kuisel, Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization (London: University of 
California Press, 1993): 16. 
52 David L. Hanley, Keeping left? Ceres and the French Socialist Party: A contribution to the study of 
fractionalism in political parties (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986): 43. 
53 G.A. Codding and W. Safran, Ideology and Politics: The Socialist Party of France (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1979): 119. 
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The political centre in the Fourth Republic comprised the left-of-centre Christian 
Democratic party the Mouvement republicain populaire (MRP - Popular Republican 
Movement), along with the non-Gaullist ‘conservative’ parties on the centre-right, 
the Centre National des Indépendants et Paysans (CNIP – National Centre of 
Independents and Peasants) and the Radicals. These parties, espousing liberal 
ideology, sought consistently to move France in a more pro-European and pro-
Atlantic direction; they were the greatest supporters of containment, NATO and 
strong Franco-American relations and they all opposed the anti-Americanism and the 
neutralism of the Gaullists. 54  The MRP in particular, in common with other 
European Christian Democratic parties, “rapidly developed an Atlanticist orthodoxy 
and became the staunchest [supporter] of the need to protect western civilisation 
through the creation of a strong military framework build around the economic and 
military capability of the USA”.55 European integration and the Atlantic alliance, as a 
result, have been described as the ‘twin pillars’ of the MRP’s foreign policy 
position,56 although their position on European integration – but not Atlanticism – 
was more divided than is generally acknowledged.57 
 
The Gaullist party, the Rassemblement de peuple Français (RPF), emerged in April 
1947 following de Gaulle’s return to the political frontline, and comprised the 
                                                 
54 Mario Einaudi and Francois Goguel, Christian Democracy in Italy and France (Notre Dame: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1952): 194-195; Francis O’Neill, The French Radical Party and 
European Integration (Farnborough: Gower, 1981): 9-13; Edgar S. Furniss, ‘French Attitudes Toward 
Western European Unity’, International Organization, 7:2 (1953): 199-212, 208. 
55 Linda Risso, ‘Cracks in a Façade of Unity: the French and Italian Christian Democrats and the 
Launch of the European Integration Process, 1945-1957’, Religion, State and Society 37:1-2 (2009):  
99-114, 100. 
56 R.E.M. Irving, Christian Democracy in France (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1973): 160 
57 Risso, ‘Cracks in a Façade of Unity’, 102-103. 
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principal traditional conservative force in French politics. 58  Gaullism combined 
domestic nationalism with an international worldview based on notions of 19th 
century realpolitik that sought to promote French interests in a dangerous world of 
fickle nation states and multiple challenges to the country’s independence. 59  De 
Gaulle believed it was the nation, not the individual, which comprised the principal 
referent of political concern – “She is a living entity”, he wrote of France – echoing 
the ‘organic’ conception of society shared by traditional conservative movements. 60 
For Gaullists, individuals owed their duties first and foremost to the nation, entailing 
rejection not only of the atomistic notion of the unencumbered, rational individual, 
but also of the laissez faire conception of the state favoured by many liberals. In 
terms of Cold War strategy, Gaullist ideology articulated a more independent – 
French-led – European position as a bulwark against perceived American dominance 
of the Western world, with the pursuit of détente aiding France’s position in the new 
global order.61 
 
 
From Communist ‘Veto’ to Centrist Coalitions, 1946-50 
French strategy in the early Cold War period was determined largely by shifts in the 
balance of forces within the government during the period and the changing 
ideological bases of strategy that resulted, as prime ministers adjusted their conduct 
                                                 
58 Young, Cold War Europe, 85. 
59 M.M. Harrison, ‘French Anti-Americanism under the Fourth Republic and the Gaullist Solution’ in 
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of foreign affairs to suit the conditions of possibility established by successive 
governing coalitions. 62 
 
Until mid-1947, Communist participation in the government actively hindered the 
development of an Atlantic security commitment. From 1945 to 1947 the 
government was comprised a three-way split between the PCF, the SFIO and the 
MRP, led by socialist and centrist premiers (so-called tripartisme).63  This shaky 
combination of political forces was characterised by interminable squabbles over 
both the degree of desirable state intervention in the reconstruction of the French 
economy and over the extent to which France should remain independent of 
emerging trans-Atlantic ties. 64  The PCF sought more intervention, and more 
independence. Any option of allying with the West or participating in the collective 
management of West Germany was off the table, both because the communists 
would immediately veto any approach that directly aligned France with the West, 
and because other countries – particularly Britain – were sceptical of cooperating 
with a government that featured communist representation.65 Indeed, in 1947 many 
in Britain remained of the opinion that France during this period was aligned with 
the Soviets against the West.66 
 
Officially, French strategy was neutral between Washington and Moscow, since the 
four PCF ministers in the government would not countenance anything 
                                                 
62 The position of prime minister was officially styled as the ‘President of the Council of Ministers’ 
until the advent of the Fifth Republic in 1958, but the post mirrors the competences held by prime 
ministers in other parliamentary systems. 
63 Young, Cold War Europe, 81. 
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Plan’, Journal of Modern History, 64:3 (1992): 500-525, 510. 
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approximating an anti-Soviet alliance.67 The clauses of the Treaty of Dunkirk, signed 
with Britain on 4 March 1946, aimed formally at preventing only German – not 
Soviet – aggression, although these were ‘cosmetic’ clauses in many respects, since 
it was clear both countries had the Soviets as much as the Germans in mind when 
drafting the treaty.68 Moreover, although a series of commercial agreements between 
the US and France (the Blum-Byrnes agreements) were signed in May 1946, these 
did not feature any politico-strategic component, nor did they commit France to 
siding against the USSR in the emerging Cold War. Unofficially, however, many in 
the French government favoured an Atlantic commitment from an early stage, 
including Foreign Minister Georges Bidault and Defence Minister Edmond Michelet, 
both centrist politicians from the MRP. Bidault even made it clear, in a meeting with 
US Secretary of State George C. Marshall in April 1947, that France could be relied 
on the counter the Soviet Union, but could not overtly follow the American position 
lest it provoke political conflict – even civil war – given the domestic strength of the 
PCF.69 A majority of the Socialists, meanwhile, supported the idea of a European 
‘third force’, rather than an explicit Atlantic orientation.70 These tensions – between 
Atlanticist, ‘third force’ and pro-Soviet positions – played out clearly in February 
1946 when Michelet, supported by Bidault, announced his decision to send the 
notable General, Pierre Billotte, to Washington to begin secret negotiations with the 
Americans regarding an Atlantic alliance, only for the initiative to be vetoed by 
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Socialist prime minister Félix Gouin, fearful of the effects on the French domestic 
scene.71 
 
French neutrality was to come to an abrupt end in May 1947, when Socialist premier 
Paul Ramadier dismissed the communists from government following their refusal to 
support proposed wage freezes and price controls, although the PCF’s Cold War 
neutralism and the perceived risk of domestic communist insurrection were also 
factors weighing on Ramadier’s decision. The PCF, for their part, used the occasion 
to claim, disingenuously, that the expulsion of ministers had taken place as a 
consequence of American pressure.72 Ramadier’s decision was based on domestic 
considerations rather than the perceived need to evict ‘neutralists’ from the 
government, although the crystallisation of the Cold War contributed to fears of a 
left-wing takeover domestically.73 It is worth noting the role played by domestic 
factors, however, since it is a helpful reminder that the expulsion of the PCF 
represented less an example of strategic necessity forcing domestic political change 
than of exogenous domestic changes in the constellation of domestic forces opening 
up new strategic possibilities. 
 
In place of tripartisme, a series of socialist/centrist coalition governments (SFIO, 
MRP, Radical) held sway from 1947 to 1951. It was under the centrist coalitions of 
the late 1940s that France aligned itself fully with the Atlantic community and 
established the necessary institutional architecture to embed this relationship. Within 
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a year of the communists exiting government, France had accepted the terms of the 
Marshall Plan, agreed to West German unification, requested military alliance with 
the US, and accepted the principal elements of containment strategy. In June 1947, 
Foreign Minister Bidault met with his British counterpart, Ernest Bevin, to discuss 
Marshall’s offer of American aid for European reconstruction. The discussions 
resulted in the establishment of the Committee of European Economic Cooperation, 
which brought together representatives of sixteen (primarily West) European 
countries to discuss the terms of European reconstruction, and which reported back 
to the Americans in late 1947. 74  The acceptance of the Marshall aid triggered 
opposition from the Communists, who denounced the plan as “a menace to peace, 
slavery to American capitalism and an abdication of national identity”. 75  The 
Gaullists, meanwhile, whilst not opposing the terms of the Marshall Plan, accused 
the Americans of being opportunists and exploiters.76 
 
Bidault met again with Bevin and Marshall in London on 17-18 December 1947 at 
the Council of Foreign Ministers’ meeting for high-level talks on security with the 
British, the Americans and the Russians.77 Although the meeting collapsed as a result 
of the inability to agree a joint position on Germany, Bevin took the opportunity to 
propose to Bidault a system for guaranteeing West European security, an idea that 
Bidault subsequently accepted.78 With the outlines of an agreement reached, Bidault 
sent the chief of staff of the French Army, General Revers, to London for detailed 
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talks, whilst General Billotte was sent to Washington to discuss a secret Franco-
American military agreement79 (the same General Billotte whose similar initiative 
had been vetoed in early 1946). At the beginning of March 1948, in response to the 
growing perception of the Soviet threat resulting from the communist coup in 
Czechoslovakia in February, the French government committed to increase its efforts 
to establish a defence treaty with London.80 On 17 March France signed the Brussels 
treaty establishing the Western European Union (WEU) along with the UK and the 
Benelux countries, with only the PCF opposing the treaty.81 Since the WEU did not 
feature American participation, however, the alliance failed to sufficiently reassure 
the Europeans about the Soviet threat. 82  As a result, Bidault sought further 
assurances from the US for a military alliance between Washington, London and 
Paris, emphasising the necessity of a formal alliance against the Soviets, while 
shortly thereafter informal negotiations began in the Pentagon between Britain, 
Canada and the US on the nature of an American commitment to Europe.83 
 
An important stumbling block was overcome in June 1948 when – having agreed 
upon certain specified restrictions on its independence – France acquiesced to the 
establishment of a West German state,84 bringing Britain and France more into line, 
and paving the way for the creation of the Atlantic alliance. French acquiescence in 
the establishment of the Federal Republic was made possible only by the absence of 
the Communists from the government by this period and the resulting ability for 
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France to publicly accept the American and British position on West Germany.85 
Formal negotiations on an Atlantic pact, this time including France, began in July 
1948, following the passage of the Vandenberg Resolution in the US Senate the 
previous month (thereby enabling the US Government to pursue a binding 
commitment to the security of the Europeans and others).86 The London Accords, 
through which France formally agreed to the early formation of a West German 
government, marked the final French acceptance of the western position, 87  a 
concession for which Bidault received substantial criticism from the Socialists and 
which ultimately cost him his job as Foreign Minister. Bidault’s replacement, Robert 
Schuman, however, was both a fellow member of the MRP and a devout Atlanticist, 
which ensured ideological continuity in French strategy in the coming years. 88 
Indeed it was Schuman who would sign the North Atlantic Treaty on behalf of the 
government of Radical prime minister Henri Queuille in Washington on 4 April 
1949, the culmination of the formal negotiations on an American commitment to the 
continent underway since mid-1948. The following month, the Basic Law of the new 
Federal Republic of Germany was approved, paving the way for West German 
elections in the summer and the advent of a government in Bonn by September 
1949.89 
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The institutional development of NATO continued throughout 1950 and 1951, 
spurred on by the shock of the Korean War,90 and facilitated – on the French side – 
by the dominance of centrist politicians in successive governments who favoured 
Atlanticist designs for French security and an anti-Soviet orientation. Between July 
1950 and March 1951 the French government was led by René Pleven, a committed 
Atlanticist and anti-communist, and a member of the small, centrist Union 
démocratique et socialiste de la Résistance (UDSR). Pleven pushed to increase the 
American commitment to Europe, calling for the establishment of an integrated 
defence system and the appointment of an American commander, and noting the 
“predominant role which it [the US] must play in the Atlantic defence effort”.91 
Pleven was also a staunch supporter of European integration, and it was under his 
tenure that Foreign Minister Schuman issued his famous declaration of 9 May 1950 – 
advocating a High Authority over European coal and steel production – which would 
subsequently set-off the process of European integration. 92 
 
Pleven’s desire to increase the American commitment to the continent fell on 
receptive ears, thanks in part to the Korean War – which broke out the month before 
Pleven took office, on 25 June 1950 – increasing the perceived urgency in the US of 
consolidating the West European security apparatus and redressing the imbalance in 
conventional forces, which favoured the Soviets at the time.93 Realising European 
force levels could not match those of the Soviet Union without Germany, US 
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Secretary of State Dean Acheson proposed a ‘package deal’ in September 1950 
whereby the US agreed to the creation of a American Supreme Allied Commander 
for Europe (SACEUR) and to the provision of an additional four divisions for the 
continent in exchange for European consent to West German rearmament.94  The 
broad outlines of this agreement were finalised in the North Atlantic Council (NAC) 
meeting of 26 September 1950 and by early 1951 the Americans had created the 
position of SACEUR (and appointed General Dwight D. Eisenhower) and were 
preparing to send the agreed additional divisions to Europe. 
 
Although France had agreed to the key elements of the ‘package deal’ (i.e. to a 
rearmed Germany), it was not keen on the overall design.95 Thus, rather than submit 
to the American proposals the French government devised an alternative schema – 
the Pleven Plan – which sought to re-arm West Germany within the framework of a 
densely institutionalised pan-European Army, thus drawing together the twin 
Atlanticist and European elements of Pleven’s philosophy. The ideas embodied in 
the European Defence Community (EDC), as the Pleven Plan became known, were 
very much the product of the liberal ideas of foreign policy espoused by centrists at 
the time of its inception, representing a strongly supranational articulation of the 
European contribution to Western defence.96 For this reason a majority of the centrist 
parties supported the EDC from its very inception, and would vote in favour of the 
treaty when it finally reached the floor of the National Assembly (as discussed in 
greater detail below). 
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Overall, the years 1948 to 1951 saw France take a significant and active role in the 
construction of the Atlantic security architecture, often going beyond even the level 
of commitment and institutionalisation the Americans were prepared to offer.97 The 
enthusiasm France showed for Atlantic solutions during this period owed much to 
the actions of centrist politicians – among them Bidault, Schuman and Pleven – and 
the liberal perspective on Cold War security they held, as well as the political 
conditions which placed them in this position. The MRP was the ‘backbone’ of 
governing coalitions during the period and held a ‘virtual monopoly’ on those 
ministries most relevant to the implementation of foreign policy (among them 
external relations and foreign affairs). 98  Furthermore, centrist dominance of 
successive governments by definition divided the opposition into ideologically 
unconnected camps. While opposition to Atlanticism came from both communists 
and Gaullists during these years, 99 it wasn’t until 1953 (as I discuss below) that these 
twin movements were able to capitalise on the similarities in their conception of 
Cold War strategy and form a (temporarily) united opposition. 
 
 
Moving to the Right, 1951-57 
The legislative elections of June 1951 brought about a moderate shift to the right in 
the overall ideological balance of the assembly, and the move of popular support 
away from the political centre. Although the electoral law of 1951 discriminated 
against communists and Gaullists, both the PCF and RPF saw their seat share 
increase. Moreover, within less than a year of the elections the Third Force itself had 
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broken down over the question of funding for religious schools. In early 1952 the 
SFIO withdrew from the governing coalition over the Pleven government’s 
backtracking on an earlier promise to remove state funding for Catholic schools.100 
These exogenous political developments came to have a significant effect on 
France’s role in the world, since they presaged the decline of the centrist coalition 
that had worked hard over the years to institutionalise France’s Atlanticist alignment. 
The onset of significant opposition to the position France had established in the Cold 
War order, therefore, was rooted in the politics of the early 1950s, and not in 
international-structural changes. 
 
In the short term, this rightward shift was not all that damaging for the Atlanticist 
cause, since the parties of the centrist and moderate-right coalition which resulted 
from the June elections – led by Antoine Pinay of the (moderate right) CNIP – were 
proponents of the Atlantic alliance and did not share the nationalism of the Gaullists 
(whose views would later come to dominate).101 Indeed, it was under Pinay’s tenure 
that negotiations between France, West Germany, Italy and the Benelux states over 
the form and function of the EDC began in earnest, with eventual agreement between 
the parties leading to the signing of the EDC Treaty by the Pinay government on 27 
May 1952.102 It was also during this period that NATO’s permanent institutions were 
established in Rocquencourt, near Paris – making France “the centre of gravity of the 
Alliance, and its defence everyone’s concern” – and that a common financing 
infrastructure was incorporated into the alliance framework, both these proposals 
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having come out of the June 1952 NAC meeting in Lisbon. 103  Yet the Gaullist 
presence in the government was, even at this stage, beginning to affect the direction 
of French security policy. Pinay, having signed the EDC Treaty in May 1952, chose 
to delay ratification owing to the presence of a ‘splinter group’ of Gaullists in the 
coalition. 104 Moreover, not only was the Gaullist grouping opposed to the EDC, they 
also attempted – unsuccessfully, at this stage – to have Schuman removed from his 
position as Foreign Minister. 
 
And yet the growth in strength of the nationalist Gaullists and the waning power of 
the political centre would come to increasingly undermine the liberal worldview 
institutionalised over the previous years. The increased support for the right 
ultimately heralded the emergence of a more nationalist discourse, represented 
chiefly by the Gaullists, whose anti-Atlanticist stance would erode France’s 
transatlantic ties in the years to come. Although much discussion of French security 
in the early 1950s centred on the EDC proposals, it was by no means confined to the 
question of France’s relationship with the proposed organisation. Rather, the EDC 
Treaty became a lightning rod around which contending views on a host of foreign 
policy issues converged, including European integration, transnationalism, inter-
allied relations, German militarism, and – most relevant to the present discussion – 
France’s place in the Cold War order.105 Whilst a majority of the centrists supported 
the EDC, around a third of the chamber – principally Communists and Gaullists – 
objected to the treaty. 106 The Gaullists opposed the undue dependence on the US that 
they believed would result from the treaty, viewing European integration as a US-
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plan to diminish French independence.107 For the Gaullists, European integration and 
the Atlantic alliance were inextricably linked; the integration of Europe through 
supranational means “had become a snare Washington set on France to deprive it of 
its equality with Britain and the United States”. Communists opposed EDC on the 
grounds that it forced France to accept US domination and to participate in actions 
that explicitly threatened the USSR. French independence, they claimed, was 
threatened by imperialist US policies, which sought to utilise France in service of 
capitalist aims and undermine the government’s domestic agenda.108  
 
Matters became even more challenging for Pinay’s successor. Unable to secure 
support from the socialists because of continuing disagreements on economic and 
religious matters, the Radical prime minister René Mayer – who replaced Pinay at 
the beginning of 1953 – was forced to bring the entire contingent of Gaullists into the 
governing majority,109 achieving a moderate consensus on domestic issues at the 
expense of dividing the government on EDC policy. 110  Meyer also replaced 
Schuman with Bidault at the Quai. 111 Whilst Bidault was an Atlanticist, he was seen 
as a more conservative candidate for the Foreign Ministry, and thus preferred by the 
Gaullists. Since obtaining Gaullist support was instrumental in ensuring passage of 
the EDC Treaty through the Assembly, successive governments – including those of 
Mayer and his CNIP successor, Joseph Laniel – procrastinated, delaying submitting 
the Treaty to the Assembly lest it fail to achieve the necessary support for passage.112 
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Under Mayer ‘additional protocols’ were added to the Treaty. Aimed at obtaining 
Gaullist support, they succeeded only in watering down the proposals to such an 
extent that little remained of the originally negotiated EDC Treaty (as outlined in the 
Pleven Plan),113 and were unable, in the end, to bring the Gaullists onside. 
 
More damaging, perhaps, than the presence of the Gaullists in the government, 
however, was the emergence of a joint Communist-Gaullist anti-EDC platform in the 
latter months of 1953. It was the PCF who initially sought to enlist Gaullist support, 
after having decided to place the anti-EDC effort above their other (domestic) goals. 
In order to make workable the modus vivendi with those on the right, the communists 
scaled back their rhetoric on those policies where they opposed the Gaullists, 
particularly labour and colonial policy.114 Joint campaigning began in March 1954, 
with the launching of an international appeal by both groups for an anti-EDC 
meeting in Paris. The publicity document noted; “the EDC Treaty will jeopardise not 
only the national independence of the nations involved, but also the political basis 
for liberty”.115 The meeting was held on 20-21 March and attracted around 200 
opponents of the EDC, receiving coverage from Le Monde and much of the left-wing 
French press. The meeting resulted in the release of a ‘catch-all’ statement on behalf 
of the participants, claiming EDC “would provide [a] climate throughout [the] world 
of increasing tension”.116 
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The defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May, a galling example of strategic 
incompetence, and evidence of an ultimately unviable and unjust colonial policy, led 
to the downfall of the Laniel government on 12 June 1954.117 The French contingent 
in Indochina had increased significantly since the sending of reinforcements in April 
1951 under the Queuille government, a decision taken with the support of key 
ministries held by MRP, who believed that “imperial considerations did not 
contradict European and NATO priorities but rather reinforced them”.118 Among the 
many individuals who had criticised the reinforcement of the French position in 
Indochina, and who later capitalised on the Dien Bien Phu ‘disaster’ was the leftist 
Radical – and notable EDC sceptic – Pierre Mendès France, who replaced Laniel as 
prime minister in June. Mendès France promised an end to the war in Indochina and 
to break the deadlock on EDC by submitting the Treaty to the Assembly (regardless 
of its chances). The investiture of the Mendès France government reflected the 
shifting balance of political power in the Assembly, and the weakness of the political 
centre. Mendès France’s government included CNIP and the Radicals, along with the 
sizable Gaullist contingent, but excluded – for the first time in the history of the 
Fourth Republic – the MRP, which had refused to support any government opposed 
to the EDC.119 Moreover, both the PCF and the RPF supported the aims of the new 
government, although Mendès France made it clear he would not rely on the PCF for 
support, even if it meant losing his parliamentary majority.120 Whereas Mayer and 
                                                 
117 Yuen Foong Khong, Analogies at War: Korea, Munich, Dien Bien Phu, and the Vietnam Decisions 
of 1965 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992): 148. 
118 Thompson, ‘Defending the Rhine’, 490. 
119 US Department of State, ‘Telegram from US Ambassador in France Douglas C. Dillon, to the State 
Department, 17 June 1954’, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954: Volume V, West 
European Security (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1979): 973. 
120 Roland Tiersky, Francois Mitterrand: A Very French President (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 
2002): 85. 
 46 
Laniel had led constrained centrist coalitions, many in the Mendès France 
government in the end shared the views of the Gaullists on which its support now 
depended. 
 
Having failed to reach agreement with the remainder of ‘the Six’ on further 
‘additional protocols’ to appease the Gaullist opposition, in August 1954 Mendès 
France submitted the EDC Treaty for ratification in the Assembly, whereupon it met 
its untimely demise. Since he had submitted the Treaty for ratification in full 
knowledge it would likely fail,121 Mendès France understood that “neither the MRP, 
nor [SFIO deputy] Guy Mollet, nor René Mayer – nor John Foster Dulles – would 
ever forgive him for the “crime” of August 30”.122 In the end, the failure to ratify the 
Treaty did not dent Atlantic solidarity as much as was feared; whilst European 
defence may have evolved in a significantly direction had the treaty been passed, 
Dulles was not forced to implement the ‘agonising reappraisal’ he had threatened in 
December 1953. Negotiations began almost immediately, at the suggestion of British 
Prime Minister Anthony Eden, on West German rearmament through the WEU and 
accession to NATO. The revised Paris Treaty – without mention of the EDC – was 
signed in October 1954 and came into force in May the following year, formally 
ending the Allied occupation of Germany. 
 
Moreover, the Mendès France government survived the defeat of the EDC Treaty, 
which – owing to an agreement with the RPF – was not a confidence motion, and 
would continue to govern until February 1955. Before leaving office, Mendès France 
attempted to use his increased stature at home and abroad – gained largely through 
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his successful negotiation of the 1954 Geneva Accords – to promote a new direction 
in French Cold War strategy. The new approach sought to relegate superpower 
competition from the military to the economic sphere, decrease French dependence 
on the Americans, and seek new pan-European security arrangements through a 
summit conference in 1955.123 Had Mendès France’s government not fallen in early 
1955 – he was replaced by his right-wing Radical colleague Edgar Faure in February 
– French strategy would have experienced a turn towards disengagement strategy 
earlier on, albeit on a more moderate scale than that of the 1960s, and implemented 
by a leftist rather than a rightist. 
 
The brief successive governments of the Fourth Republic’s final years were 
preoccupied with France’s disastrous colonial war in Algeria – initiated by the revolt 
of November 1954 – and questions of Cold War strategy took a back seat to the more 
proximate (and less ‘cold’) colonial conflict. Moreover, since both the US and the 
Soviets were, essentially, supporting the nationalist FLN, the conflict could not be 
‘internationalised’ in the manner in which the war in Indochina would be. In 
December 1955, Faure had escalated the conflict by doubling the number of French 
troops deployed in Algeria,124 although it was Faure’s socialist successor who would 
find his agenda undermined most by the conflict, as the legislative elections of 
January 1956 – the first since 1951 – saw the left return briefly to power under a 
leftist coalition. The ‘Republican Front’ was headed by SFIO deputy Guy Mollet and 
comprised the SFIO, the Radicals, the UDSR, and a small contingent of 16 Gaullist 
deputies.125 
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Mollet, along with his foreign minister – and fellow socialist – Christian Pineau, 
sought to promote détente with Moscow and, in particular, to encourage cultural 
exchanges between France and the Soviet Union. Indeed, both men visited the Soviet 
Union in May 1956 for a five-day visit at which they discussed, among other topics, 
disarmament and non-intervention.126 Mollet’s position, and his ability to bring about 
a change in France’s Cold War position, was undermined by the crises afflicting the 
country in other parts of the world. There was, to begin with, the intensifying conflict 
with the FLN in Algeria, with the Soviet Union supporting Algerian pleas for a UN 
discussion on the conflict (even if French attempts to portray the FLN as communist 
sympathisers were very wide of the mark). More problematic was Mollet’s fateful 
decision – taken at Sèvres in October – to collude with the British and the Israelis in 
the latter’s invasion of the Sinai, a coordinated strategy aimed at punishing Nasser 
for his nationalisation of the Suez canal. 127  Both examples of French colonial 
meddling drew opposition from the Americans, and the perceived lack of support 
from the US for French interests spurred a renewed wave of anti-Americanism, 
which served only to further constrain Mollet’s freedom of action.128 
 
Mollet’s government eventually fell in June 1957 over proposals to increase taxation 
for the Algerian war, to be replaced by short-lived cabinets led by Radicals Maurice 
Bourgés-Maunoury and Félix Gaillard respectively. Relations, however, between 
France and the Soviet Union were effectively on hiatus throughout 1957-58, since 
internal problems in both countries distracted their leaders from significant external 
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engagement. 129  France, along with the other West European states, was on the 
receiving end of several diplomatic notes from the Soviets in 1957 reminding the 
Europeans that their ratification of the Rome Treaty would occasion ever-greater 
‘domination’ under the US. From January 1958, the Soviets sent a series of 
telegrams to Paris in an attempt to initiate a programme of commercial exchanges, 
and suggesting an early summit meeting, the latter suggestion being rejected by the 
Gaillard cabinet. These exchanges failed to register in the French domestic scene, 
which was otherwise distracted by the escalation of the Algerian conflict, including 
the bombing of Tunisia that would lead to the fall of the Gaillard government in on 
15 April, one month prior to the collapse of the Fourth Republic itself.130 
 
 
The Fifth Republic and the ‘Gaullist Realignment’, 1958-66 
The onset of the Algiers crisis, in May 1958, precipitated the demise of the Fourth 
Republic and the return of de Gaulle to the political frontline, and in so doing set the 
stage for a decade and a half of Gaullist dominance of France’s foreign relations. The 
initial governing arrangements of the Fifth Republic, involving a Gaullist (UNR) 
coalition with centrists and the moderate non-Gaullist conservatives, initially 
precluded changes to France’s alignment, even though it was clear this was favoured 
by most Gaullists.131 It was the departure of the MRP from the governing coalition in 
May 1962 – over disagreements with de Gaulle’s designs for Europe132 – however, 
and the UNR’s success in the legislative elections of November 1962, which together 
set the stage for the revolution in Cold War strategy, since these events afforded the 
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Gaullists an unrivalled domestic position, controlling both the presidency and a 
majority within the governing coalition. French strategy, as a result, underwent a 
significant – and extraordinarily comprehensive – reorientation from 1963 onwards, 
in which de Gaulle’s vision of an independent French posture was put into 
practice.133  
 
Gaullist ideology sought to balance perceived American dominance of the West 
world the articulation of a French-led, and more neutral, European position. It 
combined realism and balance of power politics with an emphasis on the cultural and 
political independence of the French nation. Ensuring the security, and 
independence, of France required a careful balancing act between East and West, 
aimed both at resisting hegemony and reducing potentially dangerous increases in 
global tension. Practically, since France was closely tied to the West, this meant 
reducing French dependence in bilateral relations and promoting closer relations with 
the USSR as a counterweight to American influence.134 Since the end of the war, de 
Gaulle argued, French foreign policy had disappeared “in a system directed from 
abroad”, as the “pretext of Atlantic solidarity subject[ed] France to the hegemony of 
the Anglo-Saxons”. 135  Moreover, since de Gaulle believed the nation to be the 
‘permanent unit in international affairs’, 136  he regarded Soviet communism as 
somewhat ephemeral, with a return to “traditional Russian foreign policy” being the 
most likely scenario in the future.137 Hence, the desire to seek détente with Moscow 
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to balance American hegemony was rooted in balance of power considerations, 
wholly dissociated with the nature of Soviet ideology. 
 
European integration, for de Gaulle, was welcomed as counter-balance to American 
hegemony and a means of exercising French influence in Europe, but it should not be 
allowed to intrude on the political independence of its member states. When de 
Gaulle spoke of a “Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals”, he had in mind not an 
emergent polity or any form of dense supranational framework – which would, in his 
words, “liquidate the advantages [of] victory” and “be obliged to follow the dictates 
of America”138 – but rather a looser, and not necessarily permanent, assemblage of 
sovereign states brought together by common interests. Moreover, the question of 
Europe – and of the core Franco-German axis on which European integration was 
based – was nested in the broader question of France’s position in the Cold War 
order. For, as Lacouture has argued, quoting de Gaulle, “Franco-German relations 
should be organized in such a way that a closer bilateral relationship would be 
matched by a ‘greater Europe’, that a ‘greater Europe’ would be matched by ‘greater 
East-West security’ and that ‘greater East-West security’ would culminate in ‘greater 
independence from the ideological blocs’”.139 
 
The twin components of this strategy – independence from existing Western 
institutions and the pursuit of détente with Moscow – both informed the conduct of 
France’s foreign relations throughout the mid-1960s, although the writing had been 
on the wall for many years. Indeed, René Pleven, writing in Foreign Affairs in 1959, 
had warned that “all is not as it should be in the alliance of the two countries [France 
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and the US]”.140 The first element of the Gaullist revolution was independence – 
economic, political, strategic – from the American-led international order. At a press 
conference on 14 January 1963, de Gaulle outlined the strategic doctrine underlying 
France’s new independent nuclear deterrent, emphasising that it was aimed against 
all (tous azimuts).141 That same month he also scuppered – so he believed – US 
designs for a united Europe by vetoing British entry to the Common Market. 
Moreover, from 1963 onwards, the government began to restrict purchases of French 
businesses from companies based in the US.142 De Gaulle also began to gradually 
withdraw French forces from NATO command. In 1962 it was announced that 
French troops returning from Algeria would not be, as expected, integrated into 
NATO. In June 1963 the decision was taken to withdraw the Atlantic Fleet from 
NATO command (the Mediterranean Fleet having been withdrawn in March 1959), 
and in March 1964 it was announced that no French ships would fall under NATO 
command.143 Finally, in March 1966 de Gaulle informed the US that France would 
be withdrawing from the NATO organisational command, presaging the move of 
NATO personnel in France to new headquarters (located in Casteau, Belgium). De 
Gaulle also contributed to the undermining of Atlantic solidarity during the mid-
1960s through his opposition to the American campaign in Vietnam, which he began 
to make public from the summer of 1963, calling for the ‘neutralization’ of the 
conflict (essentially, American withdrawal and the pursuit of a negotiated 
settlement).144 
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Moves to disentangle France from the US-led Western system were combined with 
the pursuit of détente with the Soviet Union. Whilst de Gaulle had always sought to 
increase contacts with Moscow, both as a means of hedging against American 
domination and as a consequence of his belief that ‘Russian’ interests would 
ultimately inform Soviet behaviour, opportunities for the pursuit of a meaningful 
détente did not arise until 1964-65.145 This was largely owing to the various crisis 
afflicting East-West relations during the early 1960s – especially the Berlin crisis in 
1961 and the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 – which forced de Gaulle to show 
solidarity with the West.146 From the mid-1960s, however, de Gaulle engaged in a 
significant – and unprecedented – effort to increase engagement and cooperation 
with the Soviet Union. Believing this contact could form the basis for détente in 
Europe,147 de Gaulle undertook a visit to Moscow in June 1966, four months after 
announcing France’s withdrawal from the NATO integrated command. De Gaulle’s 
visit was not only marked with ‘unusual distinction’ for a Western leader from the 
Soviets,148 but also succeeded in establishing significant future working relations 
through the issuance of a ‘joint declaration’ on areas of Franco-Soviet convergence – 
notably on the Vietnam War, disarmament, and the normalisation of intra-European 
relations – and the signing of agreements on technical and scientific cooperation.149 
These agreements were followed up in December of that year with Alexei Kosygin’s 
visit to Paris, which occasioned de Gaulle to emphasise publicly the importance of 
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“détente, entente and cooperation” in Franco-Soviet relations, 150  although in the 
long-term de Gaulle’s strategy ultimately proved largely unsuccessful in promoting 
either normalisation in Europe or bolstering France’s global stature.151 
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Date Event 
Prime 
Minister 
Party Governing Parties (Seats) 
Oct-45 
Legislative 
election 
De Gaulle n/a PCF (148) MRP (141) SFIO (134) 
Jan-46 Resignation Gouin SFIO PCF (148) MRP (141) SFIO (134) 
Jun-46 
Legislative 
election 
Bidault MRP MRP (160) PCF (148) SFIO (115) 
Nov-46 
Legislative 
election 
Blum SFIO SFIO (115) 
Jan-47 Resignation Ramadier SFIO 
PCF (166) MRP (158) SFIO (90) 
Radical (55) 
May-47 
Coalition 
changes 
Ramadier SFIO MRP (158) SFIO (90) Radical (55) 
Nov-47 Resignation Schuman MRP 
MRP (158) Radical (55) CNIP (70) 
RPF (5) 
Jul-48 Resignation Marie Radical MRP (158) Radical (55) CNIP (70) 
Sep-48 Resignation Queuille Radical MRP (158) Radical (55) CNIP (70) 
Oct-49 Resignation Bidault MRP MRP (158) Radical (55) CNIP (70) 
Feb-50 
Coalition 
changes 
Bidault MRP MRP (158) Radical (55) CNIP (70) 
Jul-50 Resignation Pleven UDSR 
MRP (158) SFIO (90) Radical (55) 
CNIP (70) RPF (5) 
Mar-51 Resignation Queuille Radical 
MRP (158) SFIO (90) Radical (55) 
CNIP (70) 
Jun-51 
Legislative 
election 
Pleven UDSR 
RPF (107) SFIO (94) MRP (82) 
Radical (77) CNIP (87) 
Mar-52 
Coalition 
changes 
Pinay CNIP 
RPF (107) MRP (82) Radical (77) 
CNIP (87) 
Jan-53 Resignation Mayer Radical 
RPF (107) MRP (82) Radical (77) 
CNIP (87) 
Jul-53 Resignation Laniel SFIO 
RPF (107) MRP (82) Radical (77) 
CNIP (87) 
Jun-54 Resignation Mendès France Radical 
RPF (107) MRP (82) Radical (77) 
CNIP (87) 
Feb-55 Resignation Faure Radical 
RPF (107) MRP (82) Radical (77) 
CNIP (87) 
Jan-56 
Legislative 
election 
Mollet Socialist SFIO (88) Radical (73) RPF (16) 
Jun-57 Resignation 
Bourges-
Maunoury 
Radical SFIO (88) Radical (73) RPF (16) 
Nov-57 Resignation Gaillard Radical 
SFIO (88) Radical (73) MRP (71) 
RPF (16) CNIP (95) 
May-58 Resignation Pflimlin MRP 
Radical (73) MRP (71) RPF (16) 
CNIP (95) 
 
Figure 7: Prime Ministers and Government Composition in the Fourth Republic, 1945-58. 152 
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Date Event President 
Prime 
Minister 
Party Governing Parties (Seats) 
Nov-
58 
Legislative 
election 
De 
Gaulle 
Debre UNR 
UNR (198) CNIP (133) MRP (57) 
RS (23) 
Apr-
62 
Coalition 
changes 
De 
Gaulle 
Debre UNR UNR (198) CNIP (133) MRP (57) 
May-
62 
Coalition 
changes 
De 
Gaulle 
Debre UNR UNR (198) CNIP (133) 
Nov-
62 
Legislative 
election 
De 
Gaulle 
Pompidou UNR UNR (230) IR (18) 
Mar-
67 
Legislative 
election 
De 
Gaulle 
Pompidou UNR UNR (191) IR (41) 
 
Figure 8: Presidents, Prime Ministers and Government Composition in the Fifth Republic, 1958-67. 153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9: Absolute government seats by party affiliation in the Fourth Republic, 1945-1958. 154 
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Epilogue: The Politics of Cold War Strategy outside France 
Given the oft-assumed specificity of Gaullist foreign policy, it is worth briefly 
considering the extent to which the argument travels to other cases. In this final 
section I briefly consider three alternative cases – Britain, West Germany, and 
Canada. These brief vignettes aim to highlight three things in particular. Firstly, that 
the domestic politics of Cold War strategy across all cases is non-linear, with support 
for disengagement the preserve of the far-left and the traditionalist right, in contrast to 
the pro-containment position of the centre-ground. Secondly, that continuity in Cold 
War strategy in these countries is the product of the domestic strength of centrist 
elements rather than the ‘logic’ of containment itself or the existence of a genuine 
consensus at the domestic level. Although preferences on Cold War strategy are 
channelled through national institutions in different ways,155 in each of these cases it 
is the advantages conferred on containment advocates by virtue of their position at the 
political centre that ensures the victory of their preferred strategy, whether through 
competition for the median voter (Britain), centrist parties ‘tipping the scales’ 
between governments (West Germany), or the inability to reconcile domestic 
disagreements between left- and right-wings of the political spectrum (Canada). 
 
Consider first the British case. British politics in the post-war period was dominated 
by the Labour and Conservative parties, characterised by considerable ideological 
heterogeneity in both foreign and domestic policy. In foreign affairs, the Labour 
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worldview pitted centre-left ‘Atlanticists’ who favoured increased military spending, 
explicit anti-Soviet alignment and strong support for NATO and the Anglo-American 
‘special relationship’156 against the far-left who advocated disarmament, diplomatic 
engagement with the Soviets, and the de-escalation of the Cold War. 157  The 
Conservatives also divided on foreign affairs, with moderate (centre-right) 
Conservatives most supportive of the ‘special relationship’ and its piggybacking on 
America’s Cold War strategy, 158  and the party’s more traditionalist right-wing 
demonstrating greater support for resisting American encroachment in Britain’s 
(imperial) ‘sphere of influence’159 and a “return to traditional methods of great-power 
diplomacy”.160 For all their dislike of Communism, many traditional Conservatives – 
akin to their Gaullist compatriots across the Channel – favoured a balancing strategy 
as the best way for smaller states to deal with the realities of superpower conflict.161 
Julian Amery, for instance, poster-child for the traditional right, argued that Britain’s 
position “power political as well as geographical – [is] between Russia and America, 
or if you prefer to think ideologically, between Totalitarian Socialism and Liberal 
Capitalism”.162 Alongside Neil McLean, Amery attempted to cultivate links with the 
Soviet Union during the Suez Crisis of 1956, in an attempt to hedge against American 
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power.163 Thus, for different reasons, opponents of containment could be found on the 
fringes of both parties in the early decades of the Cold War. That British strategy 
throughout this period owed less to an underlying consensus, therefore, than it did to 
the fact that governments were overwhelmingly drawn from the political centre.164 In 
Britain’s majoritarian political system the dominance of the centre owes more to the 
courting of the ‘median voter’ than it does the power of smaller centrist parties, 165 but 
the implication for our understanding of the politics of Cold War strategy is the same, 
in that the source of containment’s strength lies in its domestic basis, rather than its 
functional logic. 
 
Support for disengagement strategies in West Germany came predominantly from the 
left wing of the Social Democrats (SPD). 166 Prior to the Bad Godesberg conference of 
November 1959 the SPD promoted neutrality between the blocs, 167 while the post-
Godesberg era was defined by party leader Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, an early 
forebear of détente that sought to pursue a relaxation of tensions with the Soviets and 
East Germany.168 Even as the SPD moved to a more Atlanticist orientation under 
Helmut Schmidt, support for Cold War disengagement grew among the SPD left and 
the ‘peace movement’, peaking in the early 1980s as opposition to the NATO 
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‘double-track’ decision grew.169 The West German conservative right, however, was 
noticeably less predisposed to promote strategies of disengagement than their 
ideological brethren in other countries. Konrad Adenauer pursued a ‘policy of 
strength’ towards the USSR and threatened to break off diplomatic relations with 
countries recognising East Germany (the Hallstein Doctrine).170 This stance, coupled 
with Adenauer’s staunch support for European integration and the Atlantic alliance, 
set the stage early on for the CDU-CSU’s embrace of containment. Moreover, West 
German ‘Gaullism’ – promoted by the CSU’s Franz-Josef Strauss among others – 
sought to reduce Germany’s dependence on the US, but did not seek a corresponding 
détente with the Soviet Union.171 The explanation for this specificity lies in the de-
legitimisation of the traditional conservative worldview – especially those elements 
connoting nationalism, independence, the use of force, and anti-Americanism in post-
war West Germany, since a commitment to realpolitik and nationalism, ideals 
associated with traditional conservatism, were not acceptable political values in the 
new Federal Republic. 172  And yet, in spite of the different party positions, the 
example of West Germany again reminds us of the crucial role played by the political 
centre in determining Cold War strategy, since it was the small, centrist Free 
Democrats who determined the direction of Cold War strategy at the critical junctures 
of 1969 and 1982 when the dominant coalition partner switched from the CDU-CSU 
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to the Social Democrats, and vice versa. 173  Strategic disagreements played an 
important role in both elections, although only in 1982 was the consequence of 
centrist pressures a move away from disengagement. 
 
Finally, let us consider the example of Canadian strategy. While Canada occupies a 
distinct geo-strategic position, its parliamentary political institutions and the positions 
of its parties on Cold War strategy offer striking similarities with the European 
examples. Until the mid-1970s the Liberal Party of Canada was the principal 
representative of the ‘continentalist’ tradition, emphasising the need for strong 
economic, social and geopolitical ties to the US, and the Liberal foreign policy 
platform emphasised liberal themes of interdependence, deterrence and collective 
Western security. 174  Opposition to the centrist, pro-American line, as may be 
expected, came both from the New Democratic Party (NDP) (formerly the Co-
operative Commonwealth Federation) on the left, which called for an “independent 
socialist Canada” 175 and from the nationalist Progressive Conservative party on the 
right, which – under the leadership of John Diefenbaker – aimed to wean Canada off 
its dependence on the US.176 In government from 1957-63, Diefenbaker’s Progressive 
Conservatives sought to chart an independent course in foreign relations, which 
included efforts to promote détente with the Soviet Union, with Secretary of State for 
External, Howard Green, indicated to Dean Rusk that “Canada felt itself positioned 
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between two nuclear giants and felt [a] special interest in reducing tensions between 
[them]”. 177 Yet Canada’s Gaullist moment never came about for largely domestic 
reasons. In the early 1960s as the Diefenbaker government came into conflict with the 
Kennedy administration over the question of whether Canada would take on US-built 
Bomarc missiles, precipitating a political crisis in which the NDP voted with the 
Liberals to bring down the government. The inability to overcome the domestic 
divisions between the Progressive Conservatives and the NDP – or to ameliorate the 
competition between the two parties – ultimately lay behind the failure of 
disengagement in Canada, even though the parties did not differ significantly on Cold 
War strategy. 
 
These examples demonstrate that, outside of the example of the French Fourth 
Republic, containment strategy was contested politically to a far greater extent than 
has often been acknowledged. Challenges to containment in Western Europe and 
Canada came from both the left and the right, although their respective reasons for 
advocating disengagement differed. Nevertheless, sizable political constituencies 
promoted détente, (quasi-)neutrality, and a reduction in superpower tension in the 
early decades of the Cold War in these countries. These viewpoints often remained 
politically marginal, however, not because of any underlying fault in their logic or a 
lack of support domestically, but because of the ability of centrist liberals to stave off 
the challenge to containment from the left and right domestically. Whilst there is not 
space here to fully describe the complex political histories of containment and 
disengagement in each of these countries, a cursory glimpse at the politics of strategy 
in Britain, West Germany and Canada has been sufficient to highlight the ways in 
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which centrist elements have been advantaged by domestic institutions, to the ultimate 
benefit of those advocating containment rather than disengagement. 
 
 
Figure 10: Percentage of government seats by party affiliation in the Fourth Republic, 1945-1958. 178 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion 
This article has examined the domestic politics of the competing Cold War strategies 
of containment and disengagement in Western Europe. In contrast to existing 
explanations, which regard containment as the logical response to the Soviet threat by 
a weakened Western Europe, this article emphasised the role of domestic institutions 
in empowering ideological constituencies supportive of containment. Because the 
precepts of containment strategy resonated with a distinctly liberal view of 
international affairs, its adherents – centrist parties and factions – were able to benefit 
from the advantages conferred on the political centre by systems of parliamentary 
governance; namely, an increased likelihood of governmental representation, greater 
power over coalition partners, and the ability to split the opposition along ideological 
lines. The victory of containment over disengagement, therefore, was not a 
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consequence of the internal logic of the strategy itself – which, by extension, offered 
the most appropriate response to Western Europe’s predicament – but rather the 
influence afforded key ideological constituencies by these domestic institutions. 
 
To substantiate this claim the article offered an examination of the politics of early 
Cold War French strategy from 1945 to 1966. The French case illustrates how 
political support for containment decreases the further governments move away from 
the political centre. The Communists, the SFIO-left and the Gaullists were the greatest 
advocates of disengagement, whilst the parties of the centre – the MRP, CNIP, 
UDSR, Radicals and SFIO-right – were the most enthusiastic supporters of 
containment. Moreover, the balance of centrist forces in governmental composition 
during the early Cold War was a strongest predictor of the strength of government 
support for containment at any given time. The most significant moves towards the 
goal of institutionalising the Atlantic alliance are made under the centrist ‘third force’ 
governments of the late 1940s and early 1950s, while periods of significant 
communist and Gaullist representation in government coincided – as in the pre-1947 
Fourth Republic, the latter years of that regime, and the early years of the Fifth 
Republic – with periods of heightened neutrality and an increase in the rhetoric of 
‘independence’. 
 
The theoretical argument developed here offers a competing interpretation of the 
politics of European Cold War strategy than that which currently prevails in the 
literature. Rather than viewing ideology and partisan conflict as orthogonal to 
questions of Cold War security, the argument views ideology as a key determinant of 
Cold War strategy. And rather than seeing containment as the logical response to the 
 65 
Soviet presence in Central Europe, the argument emphasises the role of domestic 
institutions in privileging those key (liberal) constituencies where support for 
containment was strongest. The argument also has implications beyond questions of 
Cold War security, since the non-linear pattern of partisan contestation (pitting the 
centre against both left and right) may be witnessed across a range of different issue-
areas and temporal contexts, including the politics of trade, international organization, 
human rights, economic openness, democracy promotion, and the international legal 
order. Accounts of the growth of (liberal) international order, both during and after 
the Cold War, would thus benefit from attention to the role played by specific liberal 
elements in Western party systems, and the ways in which domestic institutions have 
channelled liberal beliefs into specific strategic outcomes. 
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